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An important ongoing debate regarding the 
reform of Regulation No 1049/20011 on 
Public Access to Documents has managed to 
somewhat sail under the radar of European 
public and political debate. It is clear, 
however, that this is far from a „marginal‟ 
political dossier and de facto affects all actors 
at the European scene. Its impact in terms of 
the legitimacy, accountability, democratic 
nature, public perception and functioning of 
the European Union concerns citizens, EU 
institutions and Member States alike. 
Whereas the legislative reform process has 
found itself in a political stalemate for the last 
                                               
1 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents [2001] O.J. L 
145/43; European Commission, Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 
30 April 2008, COM(2008)229 final.  
With the legislative reform of 
Regulation No 1049/2001 on Public 
Access to Documents stuck in a 
political deadlock for the last 3-4 
years, this policy brief reflects on 
the main trends in the sizeable - 
not uncontroversial - body of case 
law by which the Court of Justice of 
the European Union has shaped to 
an important extent the right of 
public access to documents within 
the Union.  Indeed, when policy-
makers eventually manage to move 
beyond the current political 
stalemate, they will simply be 
obliged to take into account and 
respond to these jurisprudential 
interpretations.  Hence, this policy 
brief aims to raise policy-makers’ 
awareness of the different issues at 
stake in this dossier and pleads in 









3-4 years2, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for its part has been 
increasingly called upon to interpret the 
provisions of Regulation No 1049/2001.  
Hence, while jurisprudence is not usually 
something which tends to arouse the interest 
of policy-makers, in the debate regarding the 
revision of Regulation No 1049/2001 on 
Public Access to Documents, it is 
nonetheless of the utmost importance. 
Indeed, in ruling on a multitude of issues 
raised by requests for access to documents, 
the Court has over the last ten years 
produced a sizeable - not uncontroversial - 
body of case law that shapes to an important 
extent the right of public access to 
documents within the EU.  Therefore, when 
decision-makers eventually manage to move 
beyond the current political deadlock, they 
will simply be obliged to take into account 
and respond to these jurisprudential 
interpretations.  
With this in mind, this policy brief reflects on 
some of the main tendencies in the case law 
on Regulation No 1049/2001 and, in doing 
so, hopes to raise policy-makers‟ awareness 
of what is at stake in this dossier. Far from 
questioning the necessity and value of 
transparency of legislative and administrative 
processes in a democracy, the author pleads 
                                               
2 This is due to fundamental disagreement between 
the European Parliament and the Council, as well as 
the Commission‟s (implicit) refusal to bring forward 
a revised proposal. Eventually the Commission 
proposed a very limited revision in March 2011 to 
align the Regulation with the Lisbon Treaty: 
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents, 21 March 2011, 
COM(2011) 137 final. 
in favour of „optimal‟ as opposed to „maximal‟ 
openness.3  
‘Space to think’? 
Probably the most controversial issue within 
the access to documents debate concerns the 
need for and justifiability of a so-called „space 
to think‟ for policy-makers. The concept of a 
„space to think‟ could be described as the 
shielding of internal deliberations that serve 
to prepare a decision or other policy action to 
be taken by a public authority from instant or 
even ex post publicity. Whereas the Regulation 
contains a specific exception aimed at 
protecting decision-making processes from 
being “seriously undermined” by the 
disclosure of documents (Art. 4 (3)), the 
Court has become less and less inclined to 
accept its applicability.  
From its recent case law4, it can be inferred 
that the Court requires, on principle, 
complete openness of legislative processes, 
even if these are still ongoing. Indeed, the Turco 
judgment on appeal made it clear that 
opinions of the institutions‟ Legal Services, 
drawn up in support of the internal 
deliberation process in a legislative 
procedure, are to be made public even if the 
legislative procedure is still ongoing, unless it is 
proven that a specific legal opinion is of a 
“particularly sensitive nature” or “particularly 
wide scope [going] beyond the context of the 
legislative process in question”.5 
                                               
3 This Policy Brief builds on Egmont Paper 50 
which provides a more elaborate analysis of the case 
law concerning Regulation No 1049/2001 as well as 
of its likely practical implications. 
4 Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe/Council [nyr] (on 
appeal: pending Case C-280/11 P, Council/Access 
Info Europe) ; Joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 
P, Sweden and Turco/Council [2008] ECR I-4723. 
5 Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 69, stressing the 
need for a detailed statement of reasons as well as a 








Furthermore, in the case Access Info, the 
General Court renounced the Council‟s 
general practice, when disclosing working 
group documents, of blanking out the names 
of the delegations supporting a particular 
position or opinion. It thus imposed, on 
principle, the obligation to reveal the 
delegations‟ names in such documents 
forming part of a legislative procedure, while 
still leaving the Council the possibility to 
prove on a case-by-case basis that disclosure 
of a specific preparatory legislative document 
would harm its decision-making. 
Likewise, the Court has made it considerably 
tougher to prove that disclosure of internal 
documents that are part of a finalized 
administrative decision-making process might 
“specifically and effectively” harm the 
institution‟s decision-making capacity. In the 
recent Sweden/MyTravel and Commission case, 
the ECJ did not consider the risk that the 
Commission‟s services would refrain from 
expressing frank and critical opinions or 
might even resort to oral rather than written 
working methods to be supported by any 
“detailed evidence”, allowing it to be 
understood why, once the procedure had 
been closed, disclosure was stíll likely to 
seriously undermine its decision-making 
process.6 As regards „ongoing’ administrative 
procedures, it is still unclear to what extent 
the exception for the protection of the 
decision-making process can be relied upon. 
In her Opinion in Sweden/MyTravel and 
Commission, Advocate General Kokott 
explicitly recognized that ongoing administrative 
procedures merit greater protection so as to 
avoid undue influence by interested parties 
disturbing the serenity of the procedures, 
                                                                     
exception to the period during which such protec-
tion is justified. (para. 70)  
6 Case C-506/08 P Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, 
paras 89, 97-98, 100. 
affecting the quality of the final decision as 
well as the Commission‟s capacity to respect 
the time-limits of the procedure.7 However, 
whén a particular administrative procedure 
should be considered finalized, is still up for 
discussion. Indeed, in Editions Jacob the 
General Court deemed a merger procedure 
to have ended when the decision is adopted, 
regardless of any remaining appeal 
opportunity.8 Advocate General Kokott 
suggested on the contrary that a merger 
procedure is „finalized‟ when the final 
decision can no longer be judicially 
challenged.9 
Clearly, an exception protecting the decision-
making process touches upon the core of the 
“raison d’être” of the right to transparency and access 
to documents, i.e. the transparency of the 
Union‟s decision-making and administration 
as a prerequisite for its democratic legitimacy 
and accountability. However, though 
transparency indisputably brings about major 
benefits – including for the quality of 
decision-making – too much transparency 
could entail significant costs and even prove 
to be counterproductive.   
For instance, excessive transparency demands 
could very well harm the specific deliberation 
and negotiation process within the Council. 
Despite the hopes and aspirations of 
„European federalists‟ who see the Council as 
a type of senate in a federal state system, the 
Council still resembles more closely a kind of 
permanent diplomatic conference in which 
sovereign Member States negotiate „deals‟.  It 
thus seems rational to take into account the 
specific dynamics and „psychology‟ of such 
negotiations, which might require a certain 
                                               
7 Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-506/08 P 
Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras. 65-69. 
8 Case T-237/05, Éditions Jacob/Commission [nyr] 
9 Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/MyTravel 








degree of confidentiality. In that sense, the 
Council‟s general practice, when disclosing 
working group documents in ongoing 
procedures, of blanking out the names of the 
delegations supporting a particular position 
or opinion, might indeed have been essential 
in persuading the Member States to accept 
that the reports drawn up of those meetings 
dó display the positions taken by the 
different delegations.  Hence, when made 
public after the end of the process they will 
constitute a valuable source of information 
and accountability ex post. Moreover, the fact 
that it is “a basic finding in social psychology 
[...] that public commitment to a position 
makes people more resistant to moderating 
their views in light of subsequent 
argument”10, illustrates that the fear for an 
„entrenchment of positions’ once they are out in 
the open is not such a „wild idea‟. 
Furthermore, the risk of a switch from written to 
oral procedures would be particularly 
detrimental to the quality of decision-making 
in a context of seeking agreement between 27 
Member State delegations that have to 
communicate back and forth with their 
capitals. 
Likewise, as regards the administrative 
accountability of the institutions, there is 
once again a balance to be struck between 
„stimulating‟ and „paralyzing‟ openness. 
Indeed, the risk that “anything you say may 
be used against you” will logically lead civil 
servants to avoid asserting criticisms, at least 
on paper, which could discredit a later 
Commission action or decision. Quite likely 
the fear for disclosure has already diminished 
                                               
10 MACCOUNC, R.J., “Psychological Constraints on 
Transparency in Legal and Government Decision 
Making”, (2006) Swiss Political Science Review 12(3), 
116-117, referring to, among others, JELLISON, J.M. 
and MILLS, J., “Effect of Public Commitment Upon 
Opinions”, (1969) Journal of Experimental Psychology 
5(3), 340-346. 
the „paper trail‟ via „selective conservation‟, 
i.e. an ex post screening of the documents 
which are to be kept as part of a file. 
However, if also documents forming part of 
ongoing procedures would become subject to 
disclosure, a shift from written to oral 
procedures in controversial or sensitive 
matters seems plausible. Indeed, some have 
argued that this is precisely what has 
happened under the Swedish system, 
resulting in so-called “empty archives”.11 
Clearly, this would hamper the efficiency of 
the Commission‟s decision-making process as 
well as de facto reduce the degree of 
transparency. 
Legal opinions from the institutions’ 
Legal Services 
A related contentious matter is the degree of 
public access to be granted to legal advice 
provided by the institutions‟ internal Legal 
Services. Since Turco it is clear that legal 
opinions in legislative procedures are to be 
made public even if the procedure is still 
ongoing, unless it is proven that a specific legal 
opinion is of a “particularly sensitive nature” 
or “particularly wide scope [going] beyond 
the context of the legislative process in 
question”.12 Less clear up to now is the 
position of legal opinions in administrative 
procedures. Whereas the General Court 
seemed intent on upholding the legal advice 
exception in administrative procedures13, the 
                                               
11 AHLENIUS, I., “”Rätten att granska tomma 
skåp”, (2004) Dagens Nyheter 040423, as cited 
by NAURIN, D., “Public deliberation – a 
contradiction in terms? Transparency, 
deliberation and political decision-making”, 
(2006) Översikter och meddelanden Vol. 108(2), 192. 
12 Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 69. 
13 Case T-403/05, MyTravel Group plc. v. Commission 
[2008] ECR II-2027 (reversed on appeal in 
Sweden/MyTravel and Commission); Éditions Jacob. In 
Agrofert such protection of a legal opinion rendered 








ECJ considered that at least in respect of 
finalized administrative procedures such legal 
opinions should be made public.14  It remains 
to be seen what the ECJ will decide in the 
pending appeals in the Éditions Jacob as well as 
Agrofert cases15, and whether it might even go 
as far as to extend public access to legal 
opinions which form part of an ongoing 
administrative procedure.16 In her Opinion in 
Sweden/MyTravel and Commission the Advocate 
General conceded that disclosure of opinions 
in the course of ongoing administrative 
procedures merits greater protection so as to 
avoid undue influence by interested parties 
that could disturb the serenity of the 
procedures as well as affect the quality of the 
final decision and the Commission‟s capacity 
to respect the time-limits in procedures for 
the control of concentrations.17 
However, contrary to the ECJ‟s findings in 
respect of both legislative and administrative 
procedures, it does not seem “purely 
hypothetical”18 that such publicity could 
prejudice the institutions‟ Legal Services‟ 
frankness and independence when asked for their 
opinion, or even cause them to resort to 
expressing these opinions orally. Indeed, as 
also espoused by Advocate General Maduro 
in Turco, it seems foreseeable that a Legal 
Service will display more caution and reserve 
in drafting an opinion to avoid affecting the 
                                                                     
had ended more than a year ago was not accorded 
since the Commission had failed to provide specific 
and non-hypothetical evidence substantiating the 
risk of harm. Case T-111/07, Agrofert 
Holding/Commission [nyr]. 
14 Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, paras 109-119; 
see also the Opinion of Advocate General in 
Sweden/MyTravel and Commission, para. 92. 
15 Éditions Jacob (C-404/10 P), Agrofert (C-477/10 P) 
16 In particular when the Court deems the 
administrative document to be of a policy nature 
resorting effects beyond the individual case. 
17 Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden/MyTravel 
and Commission, paras. 65-69, 92. 
18 Sweden and Turco/Council, para. 63. Mytravel 
institution‟s scope for decisions.19  For the 
Council in particular, such a loss of frank, 
written legal opinions, aside from reducing rather 
than increasing transparency, would be 
detrimental to the quality of decision-making, 
given the context of seeking agreement 
between 27 Member State delegates, with 
differing backgrounds, who have to 
communicate back and forth with their 
capitals. 
Access to Member State documents 
Member States need to hand over documents 
to the EU institutions in a variety of contexts, 
such as to the Commission during state aid, 
infringement, etc., procedures. As regards 
such documents, the Court has limited the 
Member State‟s discretion “to request the 
institution not to disclose a document 
originating from that Member State without 
its prior agreements” (Art. 4(5)). Whereas a 
prior (dis)agreement of the Member State is still, 
in principle, binding on the EU institution 
confronted with the demand for disclosure, 
this does not confer an unconditional and 
general veto right on those Member States. 
Indeed, the Member State is obliged to state 
reasons for its refusal, and, more importantly, 
these reasons should be able to fall under the 
exceptions set out in Art. 4(1) - (3) of Regulation 
No 1049/2001 or relate to the specific 
protection accorded to sensitive documents (Art. 
9).20  The Court further clarified that the 
Community judicature should conduct a 
complete judicial review (as opposed to a mere 
prima facie review), examining whether the 
refusal was validly based on those exceptions, 
regardless of whether this refusal followed 
the assessment and application of these 
                                               
19 Opinion of Advocate General in Sweden and 
Turco/Council, para. 40. 
20 Case C-64/05 P, Sweden/Commission (“IFAW I”) 








exceptions by the institution itself or by a 
Member State .21 However, up to now, the 
Court has not yet clarified the nature of the 
institutions’ oversight over the Member State‟s 
arguments. Hence, the Court left the 
question as to who, the institution or the 
Member State, has the final word on disclosure 
of the document unresolved. 
Special versus general access to 
documents regime 
An important trend in the ECJ‟s recent case 
law is its willingness to accept that specialized 
legislation or rules organizing access to 
documents in a particular domain, for 
example the rules on state aid review 
procedures, should be presumed to prevail over 
the more general rules on access set out in 
Regulation No 1049/2001.22 Hence, if the 
specialized rules do not grant access to the 
documents at hand, there will be a rebuttable 
general presumption against disclosure. This 
jurisprudence breaks with the Court‟s 
traditionally strict stance on the requirement 
of a concrete case-by-case analysis, and its 
rejection of arguments based on categories of 
rather than on individual documents. Yet, the 
fact that Regulation No 1049/2001 affects 
such a wide variety of domains and 
situations, characterized by a multitude of 
conflicting interests, does indeed seem to 
plead in favour of relying on the legislator‟s 
specific balancing act conducted in a specific 
policy context. Whereas a general exemption 
of situations governed by specialized access 
rules from the scope of application of 
Regulation No 1049/2001 would in theory 
                                               
21 Case T-362/08, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-
Fonds/Commission (“IFAW II”) [nyr] 
22 Joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-
532/07 P Sweden/API and Commission [nyr]; Case C-
28/08 P, Commission/Bavarian Lager [nyr]; Case C-
139/07 P, Commission/Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau 
[nyr]. 
be a better solution, this would arguably 
require a revision of those sectorial regimes 
to ensure that they adequately take into 
account the public interest in transparency. 
Since this is unlikely to happen soon, the 
application of general presumptions that 
remain rebuttable on the basis of an 
overriding public interest in transparency is 
probably the best option. Indeed, it has the 
potential to relieve the institutions from the 
burden of having to establish in respect of 
every single document - from files which 
often contain thousands of pages - the risk of 
harm from disclosure, in domains where 
specific rules on access exist and the 
applicants are mainly motivated by other 
reasons than increased accountability or 
democracy. Yet, unlike in some of the recent 
judgments, the burden of proof as regards an 
overriding public interest should remain on 
the institutions who must ex officio (i.e., of 
their own motion) consider whether such an 
overriding public interest in disclosure is 
present. 
Conclusion – a plea for ‘optimal’ as 
opposed to ‘maximal’ transparency 
While the answer as to what precisely is the 
„optimal level of transparency‟ is all but clear-
cut, and the difficulty of the Court‟s 
balancing act should thus be fully recognized, 
it nonetheless seems that part of the recent 
case-law is driven by a “principled approach” 
which risks to defeat its own purpose.  
Rather than doubting the Court‟s willingness 
to “strike the right balance”, it seems that too 
little voices critical of the „maximal 
transparency‟ objective could be heard outside 
of the institutions.23 Indeed, for a long time, 
                                               
23 An exception being for instance: ARNULL, A., 
“Joined Cases C 39/05 P & C 52/05 P, Sweden and 








legal-political academic debate seems to have 
assumed increased openness to be 
unequivocally beneficial.24 And quite likely, 
such a fervent pro-transparency attitude was 
legitimate as long as the scales in the EU 
were tipped heavily towards secrecy. 
However, over time the EU institutions‟ 
attitude and openness have evolved 
significantly. Hence, I argue that the EU 
adopt should a balanced approach and strive 
for an optimal level of transparency rather 
than pursue a maximal transparency which is 
likely to come at the expense of other valid 
interests such as effective decision-making. 
Indeed, even the Parliament, which has 
played a crucial role in attaining the current 
level of openness, should concede that its 
work benefits from closed meetings such as 
the Coordinators‟ meetings as well as the 
(unofficial) pre-meetings between the 
rapporteur and shadow-rapporteurs for a 
particular dossier.  
Hence, the Court should avoid imposing a de 
facto “prohibitive” standard of proof on the 
parties who argue for the need for some 
degree of „space to think‟ and who point out 
the risk of evasion practices. Indeed, if not, it 
risks to harm the specific deliberation and 
negotiation process within the Council, to 
deprive the Commission of „frank expert 
advice‟, to rob the institutions from a free 
exchange of ideas and opinions that are given 
the time to mature without the constraints of 
self-censure, etc. More generally, it can be 
argued that Regulation No 1049/2001 should 
be reoriented towards its core business of 
increasing the accountability and democratic 
legitimacy of the EU. Indeed, given that a 
                                                                     
of 1 July 2008, not yet reported” (2009) C.M.L.Rev. 
46, 1219-1238. 
24 For a critical examination of some of these 
assumptions, see CURTIN, D. and MEIJER, E.J., 
“Does transparency strengthen legitimacy?” (2006) 
Information Polity 11, 109-122. 
non-negligible (and increasing) amount of 
requests for disclosure come from lawyers 
seeking access to large quantities of 
documents to support their clients‟ case in 
e.g. infringement or competition law cases, it 
seems that a lot of people and resources are 
being invested for reasons that do not 
correspond to the ones which inspired the 
adoption of the Regulation. Hence, in a 
world of limited resources it makes sense to 
rely on the specific rules on access designed 
for these situations and reorient the „general‟ 
Regulation to its original purpose. Moreover, 
some of these transparency efforts could 
probably even be usefully redirected to address 
other concerns such as the remaining 
obscurity of the lobbying-phenomenon.  
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